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Gregory of Nazianzus’ 
Concept of “Knowable” 
Transcendence
by Fr. William Orbih
In his book, The Domestication of 
Transcendence, William Placher expresses 
dismay over what he calls “trivial images 
of God” in contemporary theology. These 
emerge from concerted attempts by 
contemporary theologians to respond to 
the distant “lordly deity” of the Christian 
tradition, “incapable of being affected by 
the things of this world, standing at the 
summit of Metaphysical hierarchies, and 
reinforcing their oppressive structures.” 1 
He argues that while the overall intention 
is valid, this overconfidence in the human 
capacity to understand God’s nature and 
in the human ability to talk clearly and 
precisely about God has led theology 
astray.2 Precisely, it has led to what he coins 
the “domestication of transcendence.” 
That is, in calling God transcendent, 
contemporary theologians refer to God 
as unknowable, while at the same time 
fundamentally speaking of transcendence 
as though it were one among the 
definable properties of God—an utterly 
comprehensible attribute at that! 
1 William Placher, The Domestication of 
Transcendence: How Modern Thinking about God 




This paper outlines 
Gregory of Nazianzus’ 
thought on the knowability 
of transcendence 
and according to the 
Cappadocian Father, 
what knowing God 
entails. Beginning with a 
critical appraisal of what 
William Placher means 
by the domestication of 
Transcendence and his 
expressed dismay over 
“trivial images of God” in 
contemporary theology 
arising from overconfidence 
in the human capacity 
to understand God’s 
nature and the human 
ability to talk clearly and 
precisely about God after 
the seventeenth century. 
Arguing that Gregory 
articulated this problem 
long before Placher, this 
paper is an appraisal of 
Gregory’s response to 
an issue previously well-
articulated by Placher. 
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However, while Placher traces the history of this problem to the seventeenth 
century, this paper argues that earlier Gregory of Nazianzus had articulated 
this problem and even responded to it in what it describes as his concept 
of “knowable” transcendence. It argues that for Gregory, unlike for Aquinas, 
Luther, and Calvin—whose theologies Placher appraises to accentuate his 
point—God is not unknowable. God is knowable. Knowing God, however, 
is not synonymous to “containing” God. It is ascending and being contained 
by God. Theology, according to Gregory, is an ascent comparable to Moses 
ascending the mount of God (Ex 24: 18). The goal of this paper, therefore, is 
to outline Gregory’s theology of the knowability of transcendence, that is, 
what, according to the Cappadocian Father, knowing God means and what it 
implies for human nature and salvation. It will begin with an appraisal of what 
Placher means by the domestication of transcendence, paying attention to 
his evaluation of the theologies of Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin.3 Afterwards, it 
will outline how Gregory’s five theological orations can serve as a response to 
this problem. That is, it will demonstrate how, against the overconfidence of 
the Arians and Eunomians in their pretention to be able to assert something 
accurately about divine essence, Gregory insists that God is knowable yet 
transcendent. Most importantly, it will point to what Gregory thinks is at the 
heart of the perennial problem: theology misconstrued as anything other 
than an ascent of the theologian towards transcendence or knowing God 
ill-conceived as “containing” transcendence within our finite essence, language, 
and systems.4 
THE DOMESTICATION OF TRANSCENDENCE
Arguably, no other divine attribute has received the kind of attention 
among contemporary theologians that divine transcendence has. Divine 
Transcendence, as Mayra Rivera succinctly defines it, “is a theological idiom 
3 This work does not intend to be a review of Placher’s book, nor should it preclude an actual reading 
of Placher’s work. Of interest is the introduction where Placher articulates what he means by the 
domestication of transcendence, as well as the first part of the book where he uses the theologies 
of Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin to accentuate his point about how theology flourished before the 
seventeenth century.
4 I got the concept of “containing” God from a class lecture by Prof. Anatonios Khaled, Oct 18, 2019. 
Similarly, most of the arguments, especially towards the end of this paper, have been much shaped 
by Prof. Khaled’s class lectures. 
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referring to God’s otherness.”5 It is also a controversial concept, she explains, 
a concept which progressive contemporary theologians are right to be 
suspicious about, given that it is often associated with hierarchical distance 
and separation of God from creation.6 However, before this very recent era 
of suspicion and caution, there is a long history of adventure with the idea of 
the “otherness” of God who is radically separate from the created order. For 
many theologians throughout the long history of Christianity, transcendence 
is the first and perhaps the only accurate and “positive” thing to be said about 
God. As such, it is the vital prelude upon which every other thing that can be 
said about God rests. For these theologians, therefore, divine transcendence 
is the prelude to the whole province of negative theology. This is because 
transcendence does not only express the total incomprehensibility of God but 
ultimately implies the inadequacy and inappropriateness of human categories 
as applied to God.7 Augustine of Hippo is an apt representative of this school. 
According to him, the total transcendence of the godhead quite surpasses the 
capacity of ordinary speech. Therefore, “when we think about God the trinity, 
we must never forget that our thoughts are quite inadequate, our intellect 
and language totally incapable of grasping the being of God.”8 In other 
words, transcendence is what one gets when God’s infiniteness meets human 
limitedness.   
However, there have been other theologians in the history of theology 
for whom divine transcendence is simply one other thing that can be 
said about God. Karl Rahner accuses these theologians of treating the 
incomprehensibility of God in isolation of other Christian doctrines. According 
to him, rather than recognizing it as the proper starting point of theology, 
they relegate it to an afterthought. Rather than seeing it as the attribute 
of attributes, they see it as just one other divine attribute. As a result, the 
incomprehensibility of God is not brought out clearly and firmly in, for 
instance, the traditional treatment of the question of the meaning of human 
5 Mayra Rivera, The Touch of Transcendence: A Postcolonial Theology of God (Louisville KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), ix.
6 Ibid. 
7 Placher, Domestication of Transcendence, 6.
8 Augustine, De Trinitate, trans. Edmund Hill (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2015), 7.4.7.
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existence.9 In the opinion of Placher, this trend became particularly noticeable 
among theologians from around the seventeenth century, which for him 
coincides with the beginning of the modern era. Beginning from that time, 
thinkers in theology, as well as other fields, grew increasingly confident about 
human capacities. This confidence was precisely in “their ability to understand 
God and God’s role in the world and to contribute to human salvation—and 
narrowed their understanding of what counted as reasonable articulation 
of and argument for faith.”10 Just like every other development in theology, 
this was motivated by sociohistorical factors. These include the thirty years 
war (1618-1648), motivated in substantial part by religious difference; civil 
wars in European city-states, e.g., England; severe depression; and plagues.11 
In a world full of these many uncertainties as the seventeenth century was, 
Placher argues that it is only natural that individuals would want to present 
their beliefs compellingly. It is thus not the case that theologians from the 
seventeenth century onward rejected the notion of God’s transcendence, 
but that they increasingly thought they could, should, and must talk clearly 
about God. Thus, “rather than explaining how all categories break down 
when applied to God” as virtually all theologians before the modern era have 
been wont to do, they set the stage for talking about transcendence as one 
of the definable properties God possesses.12 As a result, “transcendence got 
domesticated, and theology suffered.”13
Placher’s central thesis in The Domestication of Transcendence can be 
delineated into three interrelated premises. First is the misunderstanding 
of divine transcendence among contemporary theologians. This 
misunderstanding is not that contemporary theologians misunderstand 
the meaning of transcendence. Instead, it is precisely the fact that they 
conceive of God as transcendent, that is, unknowable, but then proceed 
to make clear and concise and definite categorizations about God. Second, 
this misunderstanding has led to a domestication of the notion of divine 
transcendence. By the very nature of the concept, transcendence defies 
9 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations Volume XVIII: God and Revelation, trans. Edward Quinn. 
(London: Darton Longman and Todd, 1984), 89.
10 Placher, Domestication of Transcendence, 3.
11 Ibid, 5. 
12 Ibid, 7.
13 Ibid.
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domestication. Domestication can, nevertheless, occur in two basic senses. 
It is either that theologians ignore the implication of divine transcendence 
and pretend to be able to talk clearly and definitively about God, or that in 
appreciation of the strict implication of transcendence, they become left 
with nothing to say about God. The result in either of these instances forms 
Placher’s third and last premise: whenever transcendence is domesticated, 
theology suffers. By theology suffering, Placher means that the domestication 
of transcendence has led to many theological bottlenecks. It has led to a 
form of idolatry, where theologians create a God of their liking or fit and force 
God into systems of their own making. It has led to theologians thinking that 
human categories are transferable to God. 
Apart from process theology, which is his prime example of the tendency to 
subject the divine to the structures of human reason, Placher also sees this 
tendency to fit God into our human systems in the various forms of theological 
functionalism. These include but are not limited to certain contemporary 
theological strands of feminism and liberation theology. In addition to forcing 
God to fit into our human system, in theological functionalism, one also sees 
the propensity to want to design God to serve our human purpose. Both 
process theology and theological functionalism can likewise be contrasted with 
theologies such as that of Mark C Taylor, who, in seeking to “honor the radical 
otherness of the divine,” is left with “nothing to say about God at all.”14 Beyond 
presenting examples from postmodern theology, Placher is convinced that in 
order to appreciate just how much theology has suffered consequent of the 
domestication of divine transcendence, one only needs to look at premodern 
theology. Without over-romanticizing the premodern era or the wholistic 
theological legacy from that era, he is confident the premodern era has a lot 
to teach the postmodern era about how to do theology. He appraises the 
doctrine of God in the works of three eminent theologians: Aquinas, Luther 
and Calvin, to accentuate this point. 
All three theologians prove the vitality of theology before the domestication 
of transcendence in that divine transcendence served for them neither just 
one other thing to be said about God nor the first and only thing to be said 
about God. For these theologians, transcendence is not even just an idea to 
14 Ibid, 14.
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be kept in the background. It is one kept as a constant and ultimate focus 
of their entire theological systems. As a result, they neither kept quiet as 
though God were a mysterious unknowability nor did they, in presuming to 
talk about God, turn God into an idol of some sort forced to fit into their 
intellectual system or serve their purpose. Aquinas does this in his concept of 
the unknowable God. 
According to Thomas Aquinas, “We cannot know what God is, but only what 
He is not; we must, therefore, consider the ways in which God does not exist 
rather than ways he does.”15 According to Placher, this premise, which pertains 
to divine simplicity, does not imply radical unknowability. On the contrary, 
it shapes every other thing that Aquinas says about God in the Summa 
Theologiae, for throughout, Aquinas is both conscious of the fact that God 
transcends whatsoever we can conceive of him as well as confident of the fact 
that “we cannot know of the existence of something without also knowing 
its essence in some way”16 Thus, while Aquinas never imagines himself to be 
speaking clearly, precisely, or definitively about God, he speaks confidently 
nonetheless. Aquinas can speak confidently because he is forearmed with his 
theory of analogy.17 With his understanding of analogy, he was able to apply 
human language and our way of speaking to God while remaining conscious 
that “our language never quite works when applied to God.”18 In the end, 
Aquinas did not present us with “a metaphysical system that would place 
God within our understanding of the world and specify the meaning of our 
language about God, but metalinguistic rules that remind us of the limitations 
of our language about God and thereby make it clear that we cannot place 
God within the world we can understand.”19 Most importantly, this becomes 
the prelude to Aquinas’ treatment of faith and divine revelation. Through 
the self-revelation of Christ, we come to know God. This knowledge is the 
knowledge of faith; it is never about empirical certainty or conclusiveness. 
15 Ibid, 21: quoting Aquinas, ST 1a.3.
16 Ibid., 23: quoting Aquinas, Commentary on Boethius; Augustine, De Trinitate, 6.3
17 Placher, Domestication of Transcendence, 27. Placher clarifies that while Aquinas has become 
identified with the theory of analogy, he never propounded a systematic theory of analogy. Cf. 
Placher, Domestication of Transcendence, 72.
18 Ibid, 31.
19 Ibid: italicization Placher’s. 
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| 88 | Obsculta
What Aquinas does with his concept of the unknowable God, Luther does 
in his theology of the cross. Like Aquinas, Luther speaks rather confidently 
about God in his theological system while at the same time resisting every 
tendency to put God into any human system. Placher argues that Luther 
was able to achieve this chiefly in the theology of the cross, which he first 
expounds at the Heidelberg disputation. With his theology of the cross, 
Luther was able to remove human salvation entirely from the province of 
human effort and, by extension, human system, and place it in the province 
of God’s grace. Human salvation is, thus, what God does in the cross of 
Christ and not what humans do. As Placher puts it, “the human path to 
salvation lies not in climbing virtuously upward, but through suffering the 
suffering of despair and the knowledge of one’s sins. No self-congratulatory 
sense of our own accomplishment can survive in the presence of the cross.”20 
Luther’s theology of the cross is thus the key for understanding the rest of his 
theological system, for it is the mystery of God’s grace, which, as Luther insists, 
can never be part of any human system of moral virtues.21 On the contrary, 
it transcends all human systems, ethical or otherwise, for it is simultaneously 
revealed and hidden. It is revealed in the mystery of the cross of Christ, just 
as it is, at the same time, hidden in the suffering of God on the cross.22 With 
the dialectics of revealed and hidden God, Luther is, thus, able to put the 
reality of divine transcendence within the context of divine self-revelation in 
Christ. Like Aquinas, Luther would, therefore, insist that while through the self-
revelation of Christ, we truly come to know God, God does not thus become 
comprehensible. In Christ, God becomes a revealed God, while nevertheless 
remaining the same (hidden) God.23 The mystery of God’s revelation and 
hiddenness is, therefore and above all, an invitation to faith. 
Just as Aquinas and Luther cannot be said to share similar theological 
conclusions, neither can Calvin be said to share similar theological conclusions 
with either of them. However, while the three of them differ in particular 
doctrines, all three of them, according to Placher, resisted the urge to force 
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others—including the institutional religion/church. Placher expresses it 
thus: “Like Aquinas on the nature of our language about God, or Luther 
on the mysteries of the hidden God, Calvin counselled against claiming to 
know too much, or claiming to say what we know more clearly than we 
can.”24 This is one window into Calvin’s vast theological system. It explains 
his willingness to leave questions unanswered, “necessary consequences” 
underived, and apparent inconsistencies suspended in tension.25 It explains 
why in his Institutes of the Christian Religion, he advises us to “use great 
caution that neither our thoughts nor our speech go beyond the limits to 
which the Word of God itself extends. For how the human mind can measure 
off the measureless essence of God.”26 On the other hand, it also explains 
the practical orientation of Calvin’s entire theological system. For instance, 
even if scripture does not satisfy all our curiosity, it remains useful for Calvin, 
“To instruct us in good doctrine, to console us and to exhort us to render 
ourselves perfect in all good works.”27 Above all, it is consistent with Calvin’s 
view of God accommodating himself to our standard in order that we might 
be able to comprehend him. Calvin’s confidence in speaking about God is, 
therefore, not based on the effort of human intellect but instead on God 
accommodating himself to human capacity. Therefore, just as for Aquinas 
we speak with confidence a language about God we do not understand and 
for Luther we are to turn aside from any effort to penetrate the mystery of 
the hidden God, so for Calvin, the words we speak of God can help us to a 
confident trust in God even as we recognize the inadequacies both of the 
words themselves and of our understandings of them.28  
For Placher, therefore, the common denominator discernible in the 
theological systems of Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin, is their ability to write 
extensively about God without falling into the temptation of “domesticating” 
transcendence. They succeeded in this because they never claimed to be able 
to talk conclusively about God. They understood that transcendence does 
not mean not talking about God at all, but instead, proceeding with care and 
24 Ibid, 54
25 Ibid, 53
26 Ibid: quoting Calvin, Institutes 1.13.21.
27 Ibid, 54
28 Ibid, 60
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humility. They understood that we can talk about God as Trinity because 
of revelation. They never presumed to be able to talk about God a priori or 
outside of divine self-revelation. However, pressured they were to present the 
Christian faith in articulate systems, they resisted the urge to confine God 
within these human systems. Above all, they succeed precisely because they 
never failed to keep in focus the ultimate unknowability and hiddenness of 
God. They were conscious that, as Rivera puts it, “God is ultimately irreducible 
to our images of God.”29 However, while they were quite successful in not 
making an idol of God, their respective dominant images of God are each 
not without their inherent difficulties. For instance, Aquinas’ concept of an 
unknowable God is logically problematic. The problem divine unknowability 
poses can be stated thus: is it the case that God is unintelligible, or is it rather 
the case that human beings cannot grasp God? When divine unknowability 
is the basis of transcendence, theology might be preserved from idolatry; it 
nevertheless risks leading to theology as mere speculation on what is after all 
unintelligible. Besides, the conceptualization seems to be misleading. At least 
it contradicts Aquinas’ axiom: “we cannot know of the existence of something 
without also knowing its essence in some way.”30  
Luther, on the other hand, as Placher himself acknowledges, can only 
“inconsistently” maintain his concept of the hidden God if he must at the 
same time acknowledge the clear and vivid self-revelation of God in Christ 
through the scripture. He struggled to assert his certainty of God’s love for 
humankind in the face of human suffering.31 The same to a large extent, 
applies to Calvin. He must fit his theory of predestination within his overall 
theological picture, however inconsistent with the universality of God’s 
mercy and Christ’s perfection.32 He must assert it with certainty even if, by 
so doing, he goes against his counsel to us against “claiming to know too 
much or claiming to say what we know more clearly than we can.”33 Luther 
and Calvin are perfect examples of how not to “domesticate transcendence” 
only if we were to imply that inconsistencies in their theological systems (at 
least as presented by Placher), is somewhat a vindication of transcendence. 
29 Rivera, Touch of Transcendence, 4.
30 See footnote #16.
31 Cf. Placher, Domestication of Transcendence, 51.
32 Cf. Ibid, 61. 
33 Ibid, 54.
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What is clear is that however well “inconsistency” serves the notion of 
transcendence (i.e., protects it from being domesticated), it does not serve 
the overall theological enterprise. Or perhaps, is it the case that all three of 
these theologians ventured to do theology without first articulating the goal 
of theology? These inherent difficulties in the notion of divine transcendence 
seem to have been well articulated and addressed in Gregory’s orations. In 
these orations, Gregory devotes considerable attention to articulating the goal 
of theology and the identity and proper disposition of the theologian.
GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS AND ‘KNOWABLE’ TRANSCENDENCE
Plato had said in the Timaeus that “to know God is hard, to describe him 
impossible.” Gregory, nicknamed the theologian on account of his profound 
elucidation of the doctrine of God, had in his mind this quote from Plato as 
he began his second theological oration. He does not, however, corroborate 
it. “To tell of God is not possible,” says Gregory, adding that “to know him is 
even less possible.”34 In fact, Gregory insists that all that can be known about 
God is that God exists, that Divine existence is the only positive knowledge 
we can have with regards to God, since it is evidently to be seen in the reality, 
beauty, and order of creation with God regarded as the transcendent cause 
of creation whose “incomprehensible and boundless nature pass [human] 
understanding.”35 The implication, therefore, is that apart from divine 
existence, nothing else can be known about the divine essence. We do not go 
beyond knowledge of God’s existence to any knowledge of God’s nature. 
In other words, the incomprehensibility of the divine nature is the 
fundamental premise of Gregory’s Theological Orations. In fact, for F. Norris, 
the assertion that the divine nature is incomprehensible is the most often 
repeated one in Gregory’s Theological Orations.36 Gregory would often 
emphasize just how incomprehensible the invisible divine nature is by pointing 
to just how we are unable to fully comprehend the things that are perceptible 
to our senses. “If you do not fully grasp these things, of which your own sense 
34 Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 28: 4 in On God and Christ: The Five Theological Orations and Two 
Letters to Cledonius, trans. Frederick Williams and Lionel Wickham (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 2002).
35 Oration 28: 5.
36 Tomasz Stepien and Karolina Kochanczyk-Boninska, Unknown God, Known in His Activities: 
Incomprehensibility of God during the Trinitarian Controversy of the 4th Century. Berlin (Peter Lang, 2018). 
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faculties are witnesses, how do you suppose you can know with accuracy 
what and how great God is? This is really a lot of foolishness!”37 Thus, according 
to Gregory, it is not just the fact that God’s essence is unknowable; it is 
foolishness and smacks of impiety to imagine oneself as able to comprehend 
the essence of God. His discussion on the incomprehensibility of the divine 
nature in the Theological Oration, therefore, oscillates between the reality of 
God’s greatness and human nothingness on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, God’s unapproachableness in holiness and human unworthiness. God is 
not just supremely greater than or superior to the rest of creation; God is the 
“other;” God’s existence is radically different from that of the created order.38   
However, while this position of Gregory with regards to the unknowability 
of God is clear enough, the difficulty is the fact that Gregory, the champion 
of “divine unknowability” himself, gifts us five beautiful Theological Orations, 
which even at face value, and prior to any probe into their contents would 
imply the fact that God is not “unknowable” after all. What sounds like 
seeming contradiction is only resolvable when one understands that what 
Gregory had as his aim in the Theological Orations is neither to merely re-
state the doctrine of the Trinity nor to clarify it conclusively. Rather, it is a 
critical investigation of the language used in talking about God as well as the 
right theological posture one must take before venturing to think of, not to 
talk of or speak, about God. Explaining how Gregory’s interest in the language 
of speaking about the Trinity as well as in the disposition of the theologian 
trumps his interest in the doctrinal formulation, Christopher Beeley writes: 
Gregory of Nazianzus is best known in Christian tradition for his 
definitive teaching on the Holy Trinity. Yet in a way that does not 
fit neatly into the divisions of modern systematic theology, his 
Trinitarian doctrine consists less in devising technically accurate 
statements about how God is both one and three or even in the 
doctrine of God per se, than it does in a whole nexus of concerns 
that bear as much on Christian anthropology, language theory, and 
sacramental theology as they do on the loftier spheres of modern 
Christian dogma. One of the most characteristic aspects of Gregory’s 
37 Oration 20: 11: quoted in Stepien and Kochanczyk-Boninska, Unknown God, 211.
38 Stepien and Kochanczyk-Boninska, Unknown God, 213.
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oeuvre and a cardinal principle of his theological system is his 
repeated insistence that the knowledge of God is inseparably related 
to the condition of the human knower—that theology both demands 
and causes a change in the state of the theologian, and that it 
involves a wide range of practical and theoretical concerns that are 
integral to its meaning. 39
With this few sentences above Beeley brilliantly captures Gregory’s theological 
interest and the expanse of the work of one who is famously referred to as 
the theologian. However, while in the Theological Orations, we see a masterful 
interaction of these diverse interests, what seems to be most important to 
Gregory in these orations is an interest in the language used in talking about 
God as well as the appropriate disposition of the theologian.
The reason Gregory was more focused on investigating the language used 
in talking about God would have been due at least to the fact that, by the 
time of his writings, the council of Nicaea had already taken place. He was 
born five years after the commencement of this first ecumenical council.40 
The full divinity of Christ had been affirmed. Likewise, the full divinity of 
the Holy Spirit was at least on the way to being fully affirmed in the second 
council in which Gregory was to preside—even if briefly.41 Terms such as 
Consubstantiality and homoousious had been introduced into the Christian 
creed, and their specific meaning and usage was largely clarified with reference 
to and in rejection of the alternative usage in which unorthodoxy employed 
them. The winners and losers of the agelong Christological and Trinitarian 
debates had been declared, and the precise boundary of the Trinitarian 
39 Christopher A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light 
We Shall See Light (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
40 Gregory of Nazianzus was born about the year 330 AD, which is some years after the Nicaean 
council. He thus lived his life practically throughout the already described “second period” of the 
Arian controversy, and he was eventually to confront and refute the Arian position as none less 
than the bishop of Constantinople. At first, invited to take charge of the proprietary chapel in an 
otherwise pro-Arian Constantinople, he was eventually given full episcopal control over the city 
through the support of Emperor Theodosius. It was from this chapel, and eventually as bishop of 
Constantinople, as well as briefly as president of the Council of Constantinople, that he delivered a 
good number of his much-revered theological orations. For the biographical detail of Gregory’s life, 
see Brian Daley, Gregory of Nazianzus (Oxford: Routledge, 2006).
41 The Council of Constantinople AD. 381 confirmed the creed of Nicaea and expanded articles 
pertaining to the Holy Spirit.
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doctrine set. There is, however, another often ignored reason Gregory was 
keenly interested in critically investigating the language used in talking about 
God. This was to safeguard divine transcendence from “domestication” by 
the Arians and Eunomians in their presumption to be able to say something 
clearly, precisely, and definitively about the nature of God and fit God into 
their system. 
Despite the remarkable development in Christian theology at this time, the 
language used in referring to God remained largely ambiguous. Words such 
as “Unbegotten” as used for the Father, “Begotten” as applied to the Son, and 
“Procession” used in reference to the Holy Spirit in relationship to the Father 
and Son remained unclear and subject to diverse interpretative conclusions. 
The Arians and Eunomians, refusing to accept “defeat,” continue to advance 
their ideologies. They were interested in making their case and making it as 
clearly and precisely as possible. The different terms applied to the distinct 
persons of the Trinity—Unbegotten and Begotten—were of particular 
interest to them in this endeavor. If the Son is “by nature” begotten, he cannot 
be of one substance with the Father who is Unbegotten by nature, they 
argued, since “being unbegotten” is different from “being begotten.”42 This 
was for them an irrefutable and conclusive argument. After all, the concept 
“begotten” is scriptural, and their employment of the term was consistent 
with logic and the common usage of grammar. Gregory vehemently rejected 
this argument, and he does this across five theological orations. 
Gregory’s Theological Orations deal with the doctrine of the Trinity: three 
persons, one God. However, they were written post-Nicaea and during the 
Trinitarian controversy that both led to the council and continued long 
after it. In other words, they were essentially written as responses to the 
unorthodox position of the Arians and the Eunomians who denied the 
consubstantiality and coequality of the Son with the Father. While, for them, 
names like begotten and unbegotten pertain to the essence of the persons 
of the Trinity, Gregory disagrees. On the contrary, he argues that these are 
relationship words that pertain to the relationship between the persons of 
the Trinity. In other words, while the word begotten is indeed scriptural, what 
the Arians did with it is not a legitimate interpretation of scripture. Instead, 
42 Oration 29: 10, 12.
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it amounts to both a misinterpretation of scripture as well as a misuse of 
language. Hence, in the Theological Orations, among other things, Gregory 
gives due attention to the language used in talking about God. As a matter of 
fact, Gregory is mostly renowned, as Brian Daley notes, for his pioneering work 
in “articulating a theological terminology—indeed a theological grammar—
for speaking about God in a way consistent with Scripture and the Church’s 
tradition of faith.” 43 Gregory argued that the language used to talk about the 
being of God is never a positive assertion, but a negation. As such that the 
term unbegotten does not state the nature of the Father, but simply the fact 
that he was not begotten, just as begotten does not state the nature of the 
Son, but the fact that he was begotten. 44 Therefore, Gregory concludes that 
because all three divine persons share in the substance of divinity, they are co-
equal, co-eternal, and consubstantial. 
Similarly, Gregory notes that the term Father designates neither the 
substance nor activity, but the relationship, the manner of being, which 
holds good between the Father and the Son.45 Hence, the word Father is 
not to be predicated on God in the exact same way it is predicated on 
human beings. Accordingly, the relationship between the Father and the 
Son is the relationship between the Father who begets and the Son, who is 
begotten by the Father. This heavenly begetting is radically different and more 
incomprehensible than the human idea of begetting, which is itself beyond 
our complete comprehension.46 First, the Son is begotten in a non-temporal 
way. Next, the Son as begotten by the Father means that he is from the 
Father; it does not mean the Son is after him, and it definitely does not imply 
that the Son is not eternal.47 
For Gregory, the problem with the heretics goes beyond a misunderstanding 
or misuse of words. Thus, while he challenges the Arians and Eunomains to 
recheck their language, he does not stop there. He goes on to demonstrate 
just how divine transcendence logically necessitates that apophatic language 
43 Daley, Gregory of Nazianzus, 41.
44 Oration 29: 11
45 Oration 29: 16
46 Oration 29: 8.
47 This is equally true of the Holy Spirit. That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father does not mean 
the He is after the Father. Cf. Oration 29, 3. 
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must have primacy over cataphatic theology in theological discourse. The 
sheer necessity of saying something might necessitate the use of cataphatic 
language, but whatever one says of the divine nature is ultimately comparable 
to the averted image as in a mirror.48 This is because human finitude cannot 
grasp the infinity of God. Human language is not only inadequate; it is even 
inappropriate. Furthermore, beyond language-checking them, Gregory queries 
their overall theological posture and disposition. He queries their claims to 
know something for certain about the nature of God.49 He queries what he 
describes as their “complete obsession with setting and solving conundrums,” 
worrying that if this attitude is unchecked, the “great mystery” of the faith is 
in danger of becoming a mere social accomplishment.50 He describes as a lack 
of piety imagining oneself being able to contain with intellectual finality and 
to grasp the mystery of God rather than submitting in prayerful disposition to 
God in faith and charity. 
Whether this accurately represents the theological enterprise of the Arians 
and Eunomains is disputable. To be fair to them (to the Arians for instance), 
behind their vigorous denial of (full) divinity of Jesus was a desire to defend 
what they thought to be the integrity of the divine nature. The integrity of the 
divine, for them, totally excludes any admixture of that which is not divine. 
What is clear, however, is the fact that in doing this, they imagined themselves 
as being able to say something via positiva and entirely accurate about 
God’s very nature. This is what they did when they described words such as 
begotten and unbegotten as substance words, i.e., telling us something about 
the nature of the Father and the Son.
Using Placher’s framework, therefore, one can easily see the many ways in 
which Gregory would have appraised the theological systems of the Arians 
and Eunomains as tantamount to an attempt to domesticate transcendence. 
For Gregory, this would have consisted in their presumption to make positive 
affirmations about the divine as well as speak with confident conclusiveness 
about the nature of the deity. However, in Gregory’s articulation of divine 
transcendence, there is a significant departure from Placher as well as from 
the theological systems of Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin, which Placher uses to 
48 Oration 28: 3
49 Cf. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God, 91-2
50 Oration 27: 2.
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elaborate his point. This is first and foremost in the fact that the divine for 
Gregory is not unknowable/unintelligible. Divine Transcendence is knowable, 
first, because of the reality of divine self-revelation/incarnation. 
Also, divine transcendence is knowable through the clear and vivid 
manifestations of God in the created order. Through the reality and 
grandeur of creation, we come to a conviction of God’s existence.51 This is 
because God’s manifestation is never outside God’s essence. The knowledge 
of God’s nature is, however, never the conclusion of a deductive argument. 
It is not the fact that we can move from the created order to an accurate 
and precise knowledge of who God is in his essence. On the contrary, 
Gregory’s central thesis in the theological oration is the incomprehensibility 
of God. According to Beeley, by incomprehensibility, Gregory means the 
“creaturely inability to know the full magnitude or the entirety of God.”52 
There is nevertheless an important distinction to be made between God 
being incomprehensible in his essence and God being ungraspable by the 
limitedness of the human essence.53 
There is also an important distinction between human beings created to 
know God and human beings unable by their own effort to know God. For 
Gregory, therefore, it is not ultimately the question of whether we can know 
God or not, but the question of whether we can contain the divine essence 
within our limited essence. For this to take place, God must illuminate human 
nature. Tomasz Stepien and Karolina Kochanczyk-Boninska rightly note in 
their appraisal of Gregory’s Oration 25, 17 that “Gregory’s primary concept 
for God’s nature is light and he frequently refers to the knowledge of God as 
illumination or coming to share in the divine light. The ultimate aim of human 
existence is participation in God. Those who are purified, Gregory says, will 
come to know that the Trinity as well as the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are 
known to one another.”54 Beeley totally agrees with this. In fact, for Beeley, this 
two-poled dialectic of purification and illumination, constitutes the spiritual 
framework in which the knowledge of God takes place and theology has its 
51 Oration 28: 5.
52 Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God, 96.
53 Oration 28: 11.
54 Stepien and Kochanczyk-Boninska, Unknown God, 216.
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meaning.55 By purification, Gregory “means first of all a radical change in one’s 
character and way of life.”56  Gregory specifically sees the role of theology as 
consisting in purifying the theologian. This is both in the moral as well as in 
the intellectual sense.57
However, this is only the one step in the two-step process, and it refers 
to what is required of the theologian.58 The second step is not what the 
theologian has to do, but what God does: illumination. It is God’s gift and 
God’s grace. Even though illumination is God’s prerogative, it in some way 
requires the theologian to acquire the proper disposition. Gregory also insists 
that the end of this process of purification, illumination of the process of 
“knowing” God, does not consist of a direct vision of God. Gregory had 
compared doing theology to ascending the mount. Who may ascend? He 
answers: The one who is fit to. Otherwise, let him not come near for it is 
dangerous. Nevertheless, even for the one who is pure and who ascends the 
mount and penetrates the cloud, nothing other than the averted figure of 
God will he or she be able to see.59 Besides, because it is the nature of God 
as “superabundant being” to supersede human perfection, the purification 
necessary must be ongoing and precisely one that looks to the life to come. 
What is required is both a radical change in one’s character as well as a radical 
change in one’s life.60
The most crucial feature of Gregory’s departure from Placher (and the trio of 
Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin) is in his overall vision of the goal of theology. For 
him, the goal of theology aligns with the goal of human existence. It is not to 
come to intellectual truths about God but to ascend to God. It is not just to 
seek out ways of speaking about God as faithfully and truthfully as we can.61 
Rather, it is ascent and union with God through the process of transformation 
and divinization of the theologian. For this ascent, constant purification is 
required. Purification is not only from sin and impiety but from all our so-
called “positive” images and perceptions of God. It is also the purification of 
55 Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God, 64.
56 Ibid, 69.
57 Cf. Oration 28.1.
58 Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God, 71.
59 Oration 28: 2-3.
60 Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God, 69
61 Placher, Domestication of Transcendence, 2.
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our human language. As Brain Matz notes, the concept of purification occurs 
severally in Gregory’s teaching. Among other things, “it is the prerequisite to 
the knowledge of God. In fact, it leads to the comprehension of the essence 
of God.”62 It is, however, the task of theology to cleanse the theologian and 
thereby aid the theologian to acquire the right disposition for this ascent.63 
This is because if the “knowledge of God” is never the conclusion of a 
deductive argument, then it obviously requires more than a logical technique 
on the part of the knower..
62 Brian Matz, Gregory of Nazianzus (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2016), 45-46.
63 Oration 28: 1. 
